Cohen: 1983, ‘Justification, Truth, and Coherence’, Synthese 55, 191–207. Bender (ed.), The Current State of the Coherence Theory, Philosophical Studies Series, pp. Lehrer, K.: 1989, ‘Coherence and the Truth Connection: Reply to my Critics’, in J. Lehrer, K.: 1988, ‘Metaknowledge: Undefeated Justification’, Synthese 74, 329–47. It can thus rule out radical scepticism and avoid the problems of the correspondence theory. Lehrer, K.: 1986, ‘The Coherence Theory of Knowledge’, Philosophical Topics 14, 5–25. The coherence theory holds that truth consists in coherence amongst our beliefs. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, pp. Lehrer, K.: 1979, ‘The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge’, in G. ![]() Bender (ed.), The Current State of the Coherence Theory, Philosophical Studies Series, pp. ABSTRACT: Recent critics of the coherence theory of truth (notably Ralph Walker) have alleged that the theory is incoherent, since its defence presupposes. Bender: 1989, ‘Fundamental Troubles with Coherence’, in J. M.: 1948, ‘The Problem of Empiricism’, Journal of Philosophy 45, 512–17.ĭavis, W. Reprinted from Philosophical Studies 30 (1976), 281–312.Ĭhisholm, R. W.: 1988b, ‘Knowledge, Justification, and Lehrer's Theory of Coherence’, Philosophical Studies 54, 355–81.īonJour, L.: 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press.īonJour, L.: 1986, ‘The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge’, in P. But we must develop these more fundamental objections on another occasion.īender, J. Coherence is, moreover, insufficient for justification, because it ignores the inferential structure of the subject's acceptance system, and requires no justification of any kind for the subject's acceptance system itself. Such beliefs may be justified even though there are no other propositions in the subject's acceptance system that makes them more probable than competitors. We would argue that coherence is unnecessary for justification because of the existence of ‘basic beliefs’, those about self-presenting states (‘I have a tingling sensation in my leg’) or self-evident truths (‘All men are men’). While our current objections are directed at the ‘letter’ of Lehrer's theory, other criticisms can be aimed at its very ‘spirit’. We would also argue more generally that if coherence is anything like what Lehrer's theory says it is, then coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. We have suggested solutions for some of the problems, but others seem irremediable. As a result, the definition of justification is both too weak and too strong. ![]() In contrast with the correspondence theorys emphasis on an. The theory is the belief that a proposition is true to the extent that it agrees with other true propositions. ![]() We have argued that Lehrer's definitions of coherence and justification have serious technical defects. This explains how scientists can make claims about the very large and small objects using a system of claims already accepted to be true.
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